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STUDENT NOTES
THEFT BY TERRITORIALISM: A CASE





The international legal regime governing intellectual property facili-
tates the theft of trademarks. This is due in part to the simple truth that
international institutions respond more slowly to change than do entre-
preneurial businessmen. Under the existing international trademark
agreements, it is possible, for example, for an entrepreneur from the
United States to discover abroad a foreigner's new product with an
unregistered trademark and to register and use that foreigner's mark on
identical products in the United States. When the foreign originator
opposes the registration of his trademark by the American, the Ameri-
can's lawyers will point to the Paris Convention' and note that Article
6bis, which is the only provision protecting unregistered foreign trade-
marks, protects only those that are well known in the country in which
the registration is disputed. The foreigner's new trademark is by defini-
tion not yet well known, and will never be well known in the United
States as signifying the foreigner's product, because his expansion there
has been blocked by the American's registration. Since he will receive
no relief from the courts, the foreigner will have to buy off the Ameri-
can in order to enter the U.S. market with his trademarked product.
Otherwise, the American will have successfully foreclosed the
foreigner's entry into the U.S. market. Such abuse of the trademark
regime is anathema to the purpose -of trademark laws: it confuses con-
sumers and discourages the development of high quality products.2
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1996); M.A., University of Illinois (1992);
A.B., University of Chicago (1987). The author thanks the University of Michigan Interna-
tional Institute and Tatra j.s.c. for financial support, Professor Andreas Reindl for his insight,
and Ing. Zden6k Michglek for his comments.
1. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1629 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
2. The abuse of intellectual property rights, to steal the fruit of foreigners' labors, is neither
recent nor unique to trademarks. The Berne Convention established that copyright protection
in any member country is conditioned solely on publication within a member country no later
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This Note will argue that the "well-known mark" standard of the
Paris Convention, which is also adopted by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the European Community (EC), is an artifact of an era
when markets were circumscribed by national borders and granting a
monopoly on a trademark in one country on the basis of its use in
another was unreasonable because the likelihood of confusion was
minimal. Today, however, the trademark originator's intent to expand
beyond its original market should be presumed. The requirement that an
unregistered foreign mark must be well known in the domestic market
for it to be protected should be abandoned in favor of an "awareness of
foreign use" rule. 3 This rule would be merely the logical result of con-
sidering the "likelihood of confusion" in the future instead of the imme-
diate present, because trademarks are valued for their future use. Once
we presume an intent to market globally, we can predict that the origi-
nator's markets and the second-comer's markets will eventually overlap
and cause confusion among consumers.
This Note first examines how the Paris Convention regime of trade-
mark protection facilitates the foreclosure of national markets to trade-
marks originating abroad. Next it outlines how the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), NAFTA, and the EC have improved on the Paris Con-
vention, yet continue to leave new trademarks exposed to misappro-
priation. It then discusses the superiority of WTO enforcement mecha-
nisms. Finally, the Note proposes that the logic of the WTO's TRIPS
agreement, NAFTA, and the EC be extended to unregistered, not yet
famous marks through a modest amendment to TRIPS that would pre-
than publication elsewhere. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, art. 33, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Economist succinctly describes one situation
which motivated the Berne Convention.
Have you ever wondered why, on New Year's eve in 1879, "The Pirates of
Penzance" opened in New York and not in London? Aided by their country's flimsy
copyright laws, unscrupulous Americans had filched an earlier Gilbert and Sullivan
work with a nautical theme, "HMS Pinafore."
Piracy on the High Cs, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 1996, at 17.
3. James A. Carney published an article proposing a similar rule in 1991. James A.
Carney, Setting Sights on Trademark Piracy: The Need for Greater Protection Against
Imitation of Foreign Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 30 (1991). This Note broadens the
support for his proposal, demonstrates that subsequent international agreements have failed to
remedy the problem, and proposes that TRIPS be amended accordingly.
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vent the registration of a trademark by anyone other than the "true
proprietor.",
4
I. THE CURRENT REGIME OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION
FACILITATES MARKET FORECLOSURE
A. Legal Sources of Trademark Protection
Intellectual property rights are not rooted in natural law. 5 "That an
individual has the right to reap what he has sown . . . is far from self-
evident even as applied to tangible property. We cannot talk intelligibly
about an individual's rights until we have established a set of
entitlements." 6 The set of entitlements attached to intangible property is
a positive creation of law, and therefore a national, territorial matter.
International obligations to recognize intellectual property rights derive
necessarily from the engagements of sovereign states,7 notably the treaty
sources examined below.
B. Value of Trademark Rights
Trademarks are valuable corporate assets because of their capacity
to generate income in future transactions.8 When evaluating trademarks,
either as a nation debating whether to recognize them as property or as
a business assessing an investment opportunity, focusing on their current
market position is unreasonably myopic. Consumers prefer trademarked
products because trademarks facilitate product selection by minimizing
their search costs. 9 The extent to which consumers associate a trademark
with quality products is the ultimate determinant of that trademark's
4. The phrase "true proprietor" is that of the South African Registrar of Trade Marks.
Stephen Bigger, Republic of South Africa: Opposition Proceedings - Reputation Without Use,
69 TRADEMARK REP. 172 (1979).
5. J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks
of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 777 (1989).
6. Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 410, 413 (1983).
7. Reichman, supra note 5, at 778.
8. "The basic fact is that many trademarks are no longer mere words indicating source
but are symbols with independent value and are entitled to be protected like any other
corporate asset." Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time
Has Gone: Brand Equity as Protectible Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK
REP. 267, 282 (1994). See also CHARLEs T. HORNOREN & GARY L. SUNDEM, INTRODUCnON
TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 394-95 (3d ed. 1988).
9. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
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value.' ° If the trademarked product maintains a consistent quality, the
strength of the consumers' association increases and the value of the
trademark will increase commensurately." Conversely, circulation of
inferior goods under the trademark should cause its value to decline.
C. Market Foreclosure Under the Paris Convention
The Paris Convention is the principal international agreement gov-
erning the protection of trademarks.' 2 Its contracting parties did not
create any new rights or increase the level of protection they would
grant to intellectual property. 13 Instead, they merely agreed to extend
national treatment to foreign intellectual property.' 4 As is set out below,
the Paris Convention is an artifact of an earlier age that reinforces
national barriers.
1. Operation of the Paris Convention
Article 4 (A)(1) of the Paris Convention requires the signatory
countries to grant priority to trademarks registered and trademarks with
registration applications pending in other signatory countries, but not
trademarks for which no registration application has been made.'5 Signa-
tories are committed to recognize unregistered marks only under Article
6bis (1), where they
undertake... to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit
the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imita-
tion, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark consid-
ered by the competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of
10. See Swann & Davis, supra note 8, at 293 ("The real property or equity in brands is
their potential derived from their associational value to generate revenue."). See also Landes
& Posner, supra note 9, at 269.
11. A reptile on a polo shirt, for example, could be worth millions of dollars. Piracy on
the High Cs, supra note 2.
12. Paris Convention, supra note 1. Well over 100 states are members of the Paris
Convention, including the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and all European Communi-
ty member states. Id. at 1668-75.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 3.
15. Id. art. 4(A)(1) ("Any person who has duly filed an application for ... the registra-
tion of ... a trademark, in one of the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall
enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods
hereinafter fixed."). Id. art. 4(C)(1) ("The periods of priority referred to above shall be ... six
months for... trademarks.").
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a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for
identical or similar goods.'
6
In other words, a trademark owner may contest the registration or use of
her unregistered mark by another person in a Convention country for
similar goods only if her mark is already well known in the second
(local) market. She must request the cancellation of the other user's
registration within five years of the latter's registration date. 17 If a mark
is registered or used in bad faith, however, the Paris Convention states
that signatory countries shall not impose a time limit for requesting the
cancellation or the prohibition of use.18 Protecting unregistered foreign
trademarks only if they are locally well-known rewards only the firm
that has already created a reputation in the local market. If one's unreg-
istered foreign trademark is not locally well-known, the Paris Conven-
tion allows others to register or use the mark free from challenge. This
misappropriation forecloses this national market from the originator and
results in consumer confusion when the two marks' markets intersect.
By requiring the unregistered trademark to have already acquired a
reputation in the second market, the well-known mark standard rewards
actual commercial success, but fails to protect potential success. This
result is contrary to the very object of intellectual property law, which is
to encourage new innovation by protecting it and its potential for com-
mercial success. As noted by Professor Reichman in the context of
patent protection, "[w]hile providing temporary monopolies to stimulate
the production of high-risk, intangible creations, intellectual property
law supplies statutory periods of artificial lead time to compensate, at
least in part, for the loss of natural lead time that occurs when intellec-
tual goods are subject to rapid imitation."' 9 As with patents, a trademark
grants its holder a monopoly so that she can sell her trademarked prod-
ucts free from parasitic free-riding by pirate competitors. Pirates confuse
consumers and usurp their victim's reputation for quality, often down-
grading that reputation by circulating inferior goods.2" While the same
dynamic victimizes entrepreneurs regardless of whether their trademark
is registered, the Paris Convention does not require signatories to protect
16. Id. art. 6bi(1) (emphasis added).
17. Id. art. 6b"(2).
18. Id. art. 6bs(3).
19. J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law,
Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 83 (1993).
20. See JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[l] (1992);
Swann & Davis, supra note 8, at 293. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 269.
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trademarks that are unregistered. Unregistered trademarks remain vulner-
able to exploitation by persons other than the originator. Such exposure
encourages undercutting of the trademark and dilution of the quality it
represents when it is in its infancy and in its greatest need of protection.
By rewarding only the accrued success of established foreign trade-
marks, the well-known mark standard confronts the originator of new
unregistered trademarks with a barrier to market entry. New marks are
by nature not yet well known. Under this standard, they can obtain
protection only through local registration.
To some lawyers, it may seem reasonable to demand that entrepre-
neurs demonstrate their commitment to the local market by swiftly
applying for local registration. It is highly unrealistic, however, to
demand that an entrepreneur, or even an established firm, simultaneous-
ly develop a product, create a new trademark, decide whether to export
it, determine where to export it, and make the necessary arrangements in
all likely target markets.2' While the trademark originator is undertaking
this complicated process, the well-known mark standard allows interlop-
ers to register or use the mark in a country before the originator's
advertising, products, or trademark application cross its border.
The practical effect of analyzing the trademark's reputation, national
market by national market, is to create a barrier to market entry. The
originator will come to the second country claiming that the mark is
hers because she created it and has been using it abroad, and that the
junior user has registered or used it in bad faith in that country. The
local court, considering the national territory to be the relevant market,
can reject her challenge, saying that it is she who is the second comer.
The well-known mark standard allows national courts to deny recogni-
tion of prior use by a trademark originator solely because her use was
abroad, rather than local. The originator is thus foreclosed from using
her own trademark in that market.22
2. An Infamous Example
The decision in Person's Co. v. Christman23 is an infamous case
demonstrating the ability of the territorially-based well-known mark
21. See PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING, IMPLE-
MENTATION, AND CONTROL 441 (7th ed. 1991).
22. Even if the originator decides to enter the market under a second-choice mark, it will
suffer the costs of using a second-choice marketing program. Forcing the originator to
promote the second mark will in all likelihood result in higher prices while weakening the
market incentive for quality. Carney, supra note 3, at 39-40.
23. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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standard to exclude a foreign trademark originator from a national
market.24 Mr. Larry Christman, a U.S. national, copied the goods and
trademark of a Japanese company, Person's Co., and registered the
trademark "PERSON'S" in the United States. Within a year, Person's
Co. registered the same trademark in the United States, and then brought
an action before the Patent and Trademark Office Trial and Appeal
Board (the Board) to cancel Christman's registration. Christman counter-
claimed, seeking cancellation of the Person's Co. registration. The Board
granted Christman summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision.25
The Person's story began in 1977, when Takaya Iwasaki attached a
logo bearing the name "PERSON'S" to clothing in Japan, his native
country. In 1979, he founded Person's Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation,
to market and distribute his clothing items in Japan. In 1981, Larry
Christman stopped in a Person's Co. retail store while on a business trip
in Japan. There, he bought a number of clothing items bearing the
"PERSON'S" logo and took them back home to the United States.
26
Mr. Christman's lawyers advised him that no one had established a
claim to the mark in the United States. He then proceeded to "develop[]
designs for his own 'Person's' brand sportswear line based on [the]
products he had purchased in Japan. 27 In 1982, Christman began selling
these items to retailers in the northwestern United States. In 1983 he
formed Team Concepts, Ltd., to continue merchandising the line. The
Federal Circuit later noted that "[a]ll the sportswear marketed by Team
Concepts bore either the mark "PERSON'S" or a copy of appellant's
globe logo; many of the clothing styles were apparently copied directly
from [Iwasaki's] design. 28
In the same year, Christman applied for U.S. trademark registration
of the "PERSON'S" mark. He believed that he was the exclusive owner
of the right to use and register the mark in the United States, and ac-
24. At the 1990 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Eighth Annual Judicial Confer-
ence, Professor Donald Chisum listed this case as the top trademark case of the year in his
annual "hit parade" of the Federal Circuit's intellectual property decisions. He remarked that
it would make sense, in an era of expanding world trade, for the United States to expand U.S.
trademark rights to foreign first users. Federal Circuit Holds Eighth Annual Judicial Confer-
ence, Pat. Trademark & Copyright Daily (BNA) (June 27, 1990), available in WESTLAW,
Intellectual Property Library, BNA-PTD Database. James A. Carney used the Person's Co.
case as the focal point of his 1991 article proposing that "knowledge alone of a trademark's
prior use abroad should serve as a basis for negating the imitator's preemptive rights."
Carney, supra note 3, at 31.
25. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d at 1571-72.
26. Id. at 1566-67.
27. Id. at 1567.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
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cording to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, he "appar-
ently had no knowledge" that Person's Co. "soon intended to introduce
its similar sportswear line under the identical mark in the U.S. mar-
ket. '29 The court acknowledged that Christman was aware of the origin
of the mark and the line of sportswear it labeled, but the court was con-
cerned only about whether he was aware that the originator intended to
export into the United States.3°
Mr. Christman's trademark did not issue until September of 1984.
During the period between Mr. Christman's fir'st sale and the issuance of
his registration, "Person's Co., Ltd. became a well known and highly
respected force in the Japanese fashion industry. The company . . .
began implementing its plan to sell goods under this mark in the United
States.",3' According to Mr. Iwasaki, his sales to U.S. buyers occurred
seven months after Christman's first U.S. sales.
32
Person's Co. applied for trademark registration in 1983, the same
year that Christman did.33 Person's Co.'s registration, however, did not
issue until August of 1985, eleven months after Christman's. Shortly
thereafter, in early 1986, "both parties became aware of confusion in the
marketplace. 34 Person's Co. brought an action before the Board to
cancel Christman's registration, citing, amongother grounds, likelihood
of confusion. Christman counterclaimed for cancellation of Person Co.'s
registration, asserting, in addition to likelihood of confusion, prior use.35
The Board granted Christman's motion for summary judgment,
holding that Person's Co.'s use of the mark in Japan could not be used
to establish priority in the United States'over a "good faith" senior user.36





33. Before the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 went into effect on November 16,
1989, U.S. applicants for trademark registration could not file an application until they
actually used the mark in commerce. Now, U.S. applicants may base applications on "intent
to use," but the Trademark Office will still not register the mark until the applicant actually
uses it in commerce. In contrast to all other nations, only U.S. trademark applicants must use
their marks in commerce before they are issued registration. Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B.
Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 433, 448-49 (1993-94). By permitting application before use, the revision makes
it less difficult for U.S. trademark holders to gain priority protection in other countries under
national laws complying with Article 4 of the Paris Convention, which bases priority on the
date of application. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(A)(1).
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in the United States prior to Christman's adoption of it, and that Person's
Co. therefore "had no reputation or goodwill upon which Christman could
have intended to trade, rendering the unfair competition provisions of the
Paris Convention inapplicable. 37 The Board limited its analysis of trading
on Person's Co.'s goodwill and reputation to the past. On reconsideration,
the Board made its position more explicit. According to the Federal
Circuit, the Board held that
Christman had not adopted the mark in bad faith despite his appro-
priation of a mark in use by appellant in a foreign country. The
Board adopted the view that copying a mark in use in a foreign
country is not in bad faith unless the foreign mark is famous in the
United States or the copying is undertaken for the purpose of inter-
fering with the prior user's planned expansion into the United
States.3"
The Board thus considered Christman a good faith registrant, despite his
awareness of the Person's Co.'s first use of the mark, because that first
use was in Japan and had not created local renown in the United States.39
Its finding that Person's Co. had no goodwill upon which Christman
could have traded slights the fact that both Person's and Christman com-
plained about actual confusion among consumers.40 By not taking likely
future developments into account, the Board exonerated Christman's act
- an act acknowledged by the Board to be and labeled by the Federal
Circuit as "appropriation. 41
In affirming the Board's decision, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
that Iwasaki was the first user, that Christman Was aware of this fact, and
that only shortly after both parties were issued registrations they became
aware of confusion in the marketplace. Nevertheless, the court rejected
Person's Co.'s argument that Christman's awareness was alone sufficient
to constitute bad faith and extinguish his rights to the trademark.42 In
addition to proving the junior user's awareness of prior foreign use, the
prior user would also have to show that his mark was already famous in
the United States, or that the second comer used the mark in the United
States with the intent to block the prior user's market entry.43 In other
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1568 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1567.
41. Id. at 1568.
42. Id. at 1570.
43. Id.
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words, it might be bad faith to usurp the rights of a well-known trade-
mark, but it is not bad faith to usurp the rights, including future import
opportunities, of a trademark that is not well known. Nor is it problematic
to use trademark laws to block market entry if the prior user cannot prove
the interloper's intent to block. This decision, which is not contradicted
by Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, allows entrepreneurs to pirate the
ideas and trademarks of foreign firms who have not yet created local
renown by registering them as their own.
In addition to viewing goodwill as a static quality valued only in the
present, rather than a dynamic quality valued in terms of its potential, the
Federal Circuit viewed the market for sportswear with unrealistic geo-
graphic narrowness, thereby rejecting Person's Co.'s world market argu-
ment." Person's Co. tried to convince the court to consider the question
of prior use in the context of the global economy, and argued that its first
use of the mark, although in Japan, should establish its priority.4 This
argument followed the reasoning of a factually analogous decision by the
Board in which the second user was aware of the first user's use in an-
other part of the United States, and the Board found for the first user.
46
The Person's court did state that "the concept of bad faith applies to re-
mote junior users seeking concurrent use registrations; in such cases, the
likelihood of customer confusion in the remote area may be presumed
from proof of the junior user's knowledge. 47 The court refused, however,
to apply this concept where the first use was outside the territory of the
United States, even though the remote area where the likelihood of cus-
tomer confusion could be presumed from proof of "the junior user's
[Christman's] knowledge" was the United States. It tried to explain this
logical inconsistency away by saying that Person's Co.'s equitable argu-
ment ignored the territorial nature of trademark rights.48 In so holding, the
court itself ignored the fact that both parties complained of actual - not
presumed - consumer confusion within the territory of the United States.
The court suggested in a footnote that if Person's Co. had registered
its mark in Japan, it might have been able to obtain priority over
Christman.49 Section 44 of the Lanham Act allows applicants from abroad
to register their trademark in the United States without establishing use
44. Id. at 1569 n.18.
45. Id. at 1569.
46. Woman's World Shops v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (TTAB 1988).
47. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d at 1569 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1569-70.
49. Id. at 1569 n.16.
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in the United States. 0 They must apply for U.S. registration within six
months of filing in the foreign country. If they do so, the U.S. date of
application will be the date of the foreign application. This statutory
scheme brings U.S. law into compliance with Article 4 of the Paris Con-
vention, which requires that signatory countries give priority to appli-
cants who have already made applications in other signatory countries.5'
The six-month grace period, however, is helpful only to those registrants
who know, at the time they initially file, where they will ultimately
market their product.52. This means that it allows individuals such as
Christman to steal even a registered trademark from all but the fastest
movers.
The court decided that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
should not have addressed the question of whether Articles 6bis and
lObis of the Paris Convention applied, for it is "well-settled" that the
board cannot decide unfair competition issues in cancellation proceed-
ings.53 The court, however, did base its decision on the same finding the
Board made in deciding that Person's Co. was not protected by the Paris
Convention - that the company's mark had no reputation or goodwill
on which Christman could trade. This standard upholds the principles of
trademark protection generally - to protect consumers and to protect
significant investments in property interests - but it forces trademark
originators to establish an international reputation quickly and success-
fully, and imposes on them a high penalty for failure.54 It allows the
50. 15 U.S.C.' § 1126 (1988). But see Samuels & Samuels, supra note 33.
51. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
52. It is inconceivable that one-would know this. See KOTLER, supra note 21.
53. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F2d at 1571. Even after the trademark has been for-
mally registered, it is still possible for any person who believes himself damaged by the regis-
tration to petition the Board to cancel it. GsoN, supra note 20, § 3.05[l][b][i], at 3-117, 3-
118. The Board's authority in cancellation proceedings is "limited to adjudicating the right to
federal registration. The Board cannot determine the rights of parties to the use of trademarks,
and it cannot award damages or injunctive relief for trademark infringement or unfair
competition." Id. § 3.05[1][b][ii], at 3-120. That the Board's authority is so limited is evident
from the statute creating it: "In every ... application to cancel the registration of a mark, the
Commissioner shall give notice to all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board to determine and decide the respective rights of registration." 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1994).
See also Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Faultless Starch Co., 467 F.2d 501, 509 (C.C.P.A. 1972);
White Co. v. Vita-Var Corp., 182 F.2d 217, 221-22 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
54. The U.S. Supreme Court identified a similar problem in the domestic trade dress con-
text:
To terminate protection for failure to gain secondary meaning over some
unspecified time could not be based on the failure of the dress to retain its fanciful,
arbitrary, or suggestive nature, but on the failure of the user of the dress to be
successful enough in the marketplace. This is not a valid basis to find a dress or
mark ineligible for protection. The user of such a trade dress should be able to
Michigan Journal of International Law
sophisticated predator to steal trademarks by registering them abroad
before their creator has the time to develop their reputation or formally
register them in all future markets, and fails to protect owners from
freeriders who foreclose future opportunities.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
UNDER THE WTO, NAFTA, AND EC TREATIES
A. TRIPS and NAFTA Improve on the Paris
Convention, But Not Enough
It is perhaps unfair to criticize the Paris Convention too harshly for
its current inadequacy, given that the original version was signed in
1883." The TRIPS agreement, in contrast, was concluded in 1993, 6
integrating intellectual property into the postwar program of increased
international trade and lower trade barriers that the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) began in 1947. 7 NAFTA, like TRIPS, has
the advantage of a recent genesis and is more likely to respond to its
signatories' current concerns than the Paris Convention.
By the time TRIPS was signed, "intellectual property ha[d] under-
gone a fundamental conceptual change: the emphasis ... moved away
from sovereign matters - e.g., one of protective norms restricted to the
territory of the state - to issues of adequate protection of intellectual
property rights abroad. 58 The TRIPS agreement was born from dissatis-
faction with the protection provided by the Paris Convention and the
World Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) enforcement of it.
59
Unlike the Paris Convention, which requires national treatment but no
minimum standards of protection, TRIPS provides, in addition to
maintain what competitive position it hag and continue to seek wider identification
among potential customers.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992).
55. Paris Convention, supra note 1.
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS), Dec. 15, 1993, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 81, 85
[hereinafter TRIPS].
57. Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark Protection in Today's Global Village:
Looking Beyond GATT's Uruguay Round Toward Global Trademark Harmonization and Cen-
tralization, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 67, 84-85 (1995).
58. A. David Demiray, Intellectual Property and the External Power of the European
Community: The New Extension, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187, 201 (1994).
59. Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 121,
121-22 (1994).
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national treatment,6° most favored nation treatment,6' and detailed mini-
mum standards.62
Article 16 of the TRIPS agreement confers substantive rights on the
owners of registered trademarks. Article 16(1) provides that
[t]he owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right
to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the
course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the
trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood
of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.63
By providing that the likelihood of confusion will be presumed where
identical marks are used for identical goods, TRIPS relieves trademark
owners of the burden of proving the likelihood of consumer confusion.
Article 1708(2) of NAFTA provides the same protection.64 Unfortunate-
ly, however, these provisions apply only to registered marks.65 Neverthe-
less, the logic underlying the presumption suggests that confusion
should also be presumed in cases like Person's Co. v. Christman, be-
cause the fact of a mark's registration in a government office has noth-
ing to do with the effect of duplicate marks in the public market. Sim-
ply put, registration works no magic on consumers.
TRIPS Article 16(2) and NAFTA Article 1708(6) extend Article
6bis of the Paris Convention to services.' Both also specify that, in
considering whether a mark is well known, the affected public's knowl-
edge should be taken into account, including knowledge gained as a
result of promotions.6 7 This provision may be read to explicitly encom-
pass reputations created by advertising in one country that spills over
into another where the product is not yet available. This approach has
been used for decades to recognize the goodwill that a trademark owner
can generate in a country without directly selling there.68
60. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 3.
61. Id. art. 4.
62. Id. part II; see also Cordray, supra note 59, at 125.
•63. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(1).
64. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA), Free Trade L. Rep. (CCH) Special
Rep. No. 39, extra ed., art. 1708(2) [hereinafter NAFTA].
65. The Madrid Agreement similarly makes protection contingent on registration. It
allows nationals of forty member countries to secure protection in all of the other signatory
states through a single international registration. Madrid Agreement Concerning the Interna-
tional Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised July 14, 1967).
66. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(2); NAFrA, supra note 64, art. 1708(6).
67. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(2); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(6).
68. See, e.g., Thomas J. Hoffman & Susan E. Brownstone, Protection of Trademark
Rights Acquired by International Reputation Without Use or Registration, 71 TRADEMARK
Michigan Journal of International Law
By including knowledge gained as a result of promotions in Paris
Convention Article 6bis cases, TRIPS Article 16(2) and NAFTA Article
1708(6) prevent courts from focusing exclusively on sales. Ignoring
other sources of consumer knowledge allows a trademark copier to
prevent the market entry of the trademark's originator in many cases.
This inclusion of knowledge gained from promotions should influence
courts sharing the mindset of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which in Person's Co. v. Christman repeatedly noted that
Person's had not yet entered U.S. commerce.
TRIPS Article 16(3), which has no parallel in NAFTA, also goes
beyond the Paris Convention in terms of the scope of the protection it
gives to registered marks. It provides that Article 6bis of the Paris Con-
vention shall apply
to goods and services which are not similar to those in respect of
which a trademark is registered, provided that use of that trade-
mark in relation to those goods and services would indicate a
connection between those goods and services and the owner of the
registered mark and provided that the interests of the owner of the
registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.69
Article 6bis itself mentions only marks "used for identical or similar
goods." 70 TRIPS Article 16(3) provides more complete protection of a
trademark's existing goodwill. It recognizes that the reputation of a
mark can be affected by any goods "connected" or associated with it in
the consumers' minds.7' It is immaterial whether the actual products to
which the copier attaches the mark are similar. What matters is the
association. TRIPS is an improvement on the Paris Convention because
it recognizes this important point.
Article 16(3) treats existing goodwill in one product market as pro-
spective property in another product market. It reserves a spot in new
markets that the trademark owner may want to enter, thus recognizing
that trademark values are prospective and entitled to protection. Unfortu-
nately, Article 16(3) applies only to registered marks. The idea behind
Article 16(3), however, is applicable equally to unregistered marks, for
a mark's status as registered or unregistered is unrelated to whether con-
REP. 1, 14-16 (1981) (citing C & A Modes v. C & A (Waterford) Limited, Case No.
1973/1608-9P (103/104-1975) (Ir. S.C., Dec. 16, 1975) (unreported)).
69. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(3) (emphasis added).
70. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6 h(1 ).
71. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(3).
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sumers mentally associate that mark with a product other than the one to
which it is physically attached. Once again, all that matters is the
association in consumers' minds of one product's quality with another's
trademark.
In addition to NAFTA's lack of a provision parallel to TRIPS Arti-
cle 16(3), the TRIPS and NAFTA agreements diverge in their require-
ments of use to maintain a registration.72 Both TRIPS Article 15(3) and
NAFTA Article 1708(3) state that parties may make registrability
contingent on use. 73 As for maintenance of registration, NAFTA Article
1708(8) states that each party "shall require the use of a trademark to
maintain a registration. The registration may be canceled for the reason
of non-use only after an uninterrupted period of at least two years of
non-use, unless valid reasons ... are shown. 7 4 In contrast, TRIPS
Article 19(1) states that "[if use is required to maintain a registration,
the registration may be cancelled only after an uninterrupted period of at
least three years of non-use, unless valid reasons ... are shown. 75 On
its face, NAFTA thus provides stronger measures against so-called
"dead wood" registrations by requiring that marks unused for a period
of two years be denied continued registration, rather than giving mem-
bers the option of continuing registration even after three years of non-
use.
76
B. EC Law Perpetuates the Bias Against
Unregistered Foreign Trademarks
The EC has taken a significant step toward eradicating internal trade
barriers by allowing one to register for a Community-wide trademark.
77
The Council Regulation on the Community trade mark (the Regulation)
treats the Community as one large market, rather than a group of nation-
al markets.78 Unfortunately, however, its expansive conceptualization of
the market is necessarily limited to that of the EC itself.
72. Id. art. 15(3); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(3).
73. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 15(3); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(3).
74. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(8).
75. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 19(1) (emphasis added).
76. See id. art. 15(3); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(8).
77. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. The introduction of the "Community
trade mark" does not displace member states' ability to offer national trade marks. Id. pmbl.
para. 9, art. 108.
78. Id.
Michigan Journal of International Law
European Community member states' own provision of national
trademarks is governed by the EC's First Council Directive to approxi-
mate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (the Direc-
tive). The Directive does not deprive member states of the right to
continue to protect marks acquired through use. Instead, it focuses on
bringing national rules into harmony with respect to registration.79 The
Directive requires member states to implement legislation substantively
similar to that required by TRIPS and NAFTA. In particular, its Article
4 declares that a trademark shall not be registered if it is identical to an
"earlier mark," or if, because of its identity with or similarity to an
"earlier mark" and the goods or services it labels, it is likely that the
public will be confused.80 The definition of an "earlier mark" is limited
to marks for which registration has already been applied, and marks that
are well known under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.8'
The Directive's extension of protection to marks against registration
of similar or identical marks on dissimilar goods or services is analo-
gous to TRIPS Article 16(3). Article 4(3) of the Directive limits this
extended protection to earlier registered or well-known marks8 2 that have
"a reputation in the Community" 83 where the use of the later mark
would "take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the earlier Community trade mark., 84 TRIPS
similarly limits the extension to cases in which use of the second mark
would suggest a connection between the goods or services it labels and
the owner of the registered or well-known mark, where the interests of
the owner are likely to be damaged. 85 Both require that consumers
already know of the initial trademark, thereby ignoring the risk of
market foreclosure by preemptive registration of the originator's nascent
mark - registered or not - by someone else.
79. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, pmbl.
80. Id. art. 4(1).
81. Id. art. 4(2).
82. Id. art. 4(3).
83. Florent Gevers notes that the need for a "reputation" is a new concept. Gevers
explains that it is a lower standard than "well known," but there is no official explanation as
to what level of knowledge meets this requirement. Florent Gevers, Practical Aspects Regard-
ing the Changing Scenery of European Trademark Law 25 (Apr. 7-8, 1994) (unpublished
paper given at the Second Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and
Policy, Fordham University School of Law) (on file with Michigan Journal of International
Law). This lower standard applies only to registered marks; it does not apply to unregistered
marks, for the definition of "earlier marks" includes only registered marks and well-known
marks. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, supra note 79, art. 4(2).
84. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, supra note 79, art. 4(3).
85. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(3).
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The Directive permits member states to deny registration to applica-
tions made in bad faith86 Yet, under Article 4(4)(g) it protects marks in
use abroad against registration by others only if two conditions are met:
(1) such registration would likely cause the public to confuse the newly
registered mark with the mark used abroad, and (2) the applicant was
acting in bad faith when he applied for registration.87 Bad faith- alone is
thus an insufficient basis for denying an applicant's registration of a mark
already in use abroad. The mark in use abroad must already have acquired
enough of a reputation to cause consumers to confuse the newly registered
mark with it; that is to say, it must be locally well-known.
The EC is more lenient than TRIPS and NAFTA With respect to the
amount of time a registrant can continuously fail to use his mark and
still maintain the registration. 8 Article 12 of the Directive gives the
owner of the registration a five-year grace period, in contrast to TRIPS's
period of three years and NAFTA's two years.89 Article 50 of the Regu-
lation likewise allows* five years of continuous non-use.9 This longer
period extends the time during which the originator of an unregistered
trademark may be shut out of a national market by someone who merely
registered in the Community before the originator's mark gained a
reputation there.
III. WTO, THROUGH TRIPS, SHOULD ADOPT AN AWARENESS
OF PRIOR USE STANDARD
A. WTO Enforcement Mechanisms Are More Effective
Than Those of the Paris Convention
1. Paris Convention Lacks an Effective Enforcement Mechanism
Article 28 of the Paris Convention requires parties to submit dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)." This means that a
party seeking recourse under the Convention must convince his national
government to bring a case against his opponent's national government.
Article 28(2) allows each country, at the time it signs the Convention or
deposits its instrument of ratification or accession, to declare that it does
not consider itself subject to the ICJ's jurisdiction.92 Approximately one-
86. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, supra note 79, art. 3(2)(d).
87. Id. art. 4(4)(g).
88. Id. art. 12.
89. Id.; TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 19(1); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(8).
90. Council Regulation 40/94, supra note 77, art. 50.
91. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
92. Id.
Michigan Journal of International Law
fourth of the members of the Paris Convention refused to accept ICJ
jurisdiction.93 Moreover, even the parties who accepted ICJ jurisdiction
do not use this procedure because it is diplomatically problematic and
practically ineffective.94 "[N]obody would sue a state which violates is
[sic] obligations" which result from WIPO Conventions "before the
International Court of Justice in the Hague ... because the sued state
would interpret the action as an unfriendly act."95 If they did sue, the
resulting ICJ decision would not be enforced, because ICJ judgments are
enforceable only by the United Nations Security Council, which is
highly unlikely to take action to enforce an intellectual property judg-
ment.96 Thus, it is risky for private actors to rely on the Paris Conven-
tion.97
The alternative, registering in every nation in which one plans to
export, is also confounded. The registration fee in a given foreign
country may be less than the costs of the uncertainty of whether a
foreign judge will recognize the trademark as locally well known. Yet it
is prohibitively expensive for novice entrepreneurs to register in every
national market they plan someday to enter.9" Nor is it reasonable to
expect originators of new trademarks to know immediately where they
will ultimately expand.99
The expense of registration, combined with the absence of a realistic
international hearing, puts a premium on out-of-court settlements. In
both emerging and developed markets, smart entrepreneurs register and
93. Cordray, supra note 59, at 131. See also Reichman, supra note 5, at 773-75.
94. Cordray, supra note 59, at 131.
95. Id. at 131 (quoting Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg-
Symposium, in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 1, 19 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989)).
96. Cordray, supra note 59, at 132.
97. The Berne Convention, supra note 2, similarly refers cases to the ICJ. Over more
than a century later, no nation has brought a copyright action before the ICJ under the Berne
Convention. Bhushan Bahree, U.S., European Union Turn to WTO to Make Japan Extend
Music Protection, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at A10. See also Joos & Moufang, supra note
95, at 36 ("No state would take such a step only to clarify a disputed issue in industrial
property or copyright law.").
98. Applying for registration in foreign jurisdictions requires the payment of attorney
fees, translation costs, and filing fees. The filing fee for the United States is $245. Pub. L.
No. 103-79, § 4, 107 Stat. 2040 (Dec. 3, 1993). The official filing fees in other countries are
similar: e.g., Bolivia, 60,000 Bolivianos; Czech Republic, 3,000 Crowns; Germany, 500
Deutsche Marks; Japan, 21,000 Yen; and South Africa, 16 Rand. MANUAL FOR THE HAN-
DLING OF APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD (Manual Indus. Prop.) 2-4, 24, 48, 36 (Supp. 74, Oct. 1995). Thus, defensive filing
quickly adds up to be a costly proposition.
99. See generally KOTLER, supra note 21, at 39-47.
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"warehouse" the trademarks of well-known companies.l1° When a target-
ed company decides to enter the market, it discovers that someone has
already unscrupulously registered its trademark as his own. To enter the
market and continue to use the same trademark, the company must pay
off the warehouser or adopt a completely different trademark. The price
it pays is less than the cost of litigation, but it is nevertheless a toll to
cross a border.
2. TRIPS, Backed by WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures, Is Enforceable
The TRIPS rules are backed by WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures,' 0' which create incentives for parties to cooperate by allowing
contracting parties to suspend GATT obligations or concessions to the
offending party.'0 2 TRIPS, in contrast to the Paris Convention, links
intellectual property with the trade law of GATT, and provides a dispute
settlement procedure that reinforces the linkage of compliance with
TRIPS to concessions from GATT parties. 0 3 These concessions are in
turn linked to the parties' trade balances and economic health.
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU) sets out the dispute resolution process applica-
ble to TRIPS, which is administered by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) of the WTO.' 4 The outline of the process is as follows: members
are to make an effort to work out their disagreements through consulta-
tions. 05 If a member requests a consultation, the member to which the
request is made must reply within ten days and enter into good faith
consultations within thirty days of the request. 1° 6 If both parties agree
100. See GILSON, supra note 20, § 9.01; see also Bruce I. Konviser, A Czech Entrepre-
neur Makes Names for Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at C4. The Czech parliament has
changed its law to make warehousing more difficult by switching from a strict first-to-file
system to one which provides for objections prior to registration. New Trademark Law: More
Protection for Well-Known Marks, E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, Sept. 1, 1995. This phenomenon is
not unique to emerging markets. Warehousers are also registering others' trademarks and
names as their own Internet domain names, currently assigned on a first-to-file basis. Hear-
ings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Catherine Simmons-Gill,
President, International Trademark Association).
101. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 64.
102. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the
Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
103. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 64; DSU, supra note 102, art. 22.
104. DSU, supra note 102, art. 2.1.
105. Id. art. 4.2.
106. Id. art. 4.3.
Michigan Journal of International Law
that the consultations have failed to resolve the dispute sixty days after
the request, then the complaining party may request that a panel be
formed by the DSB to examine the dispute in light of the relevant
provisions of the governing agreement.'0 7 Panels are composed of three
or five "well-qualified" individuals. 08 A panel makes findings and then
submits a report'to the DSB. 1 9 If a party fails to comply with the rul-
ings or recommendations of the DSB within a reasonable time, the
complaining party may suspend obligations or concessions under the
relevant agreement with respect to the recalcitrant party."'
While recourse to the DSU requires state espousal, there is good
reason to believe that intellectual property disputes will not languish
there the way they have under the Paris Convention regime. Only a few
years after the signing of TRIPS, the United States has already brought
an intellectual property complaint against Japan before the DSU."I
TRIPS is not just more easily enforced than the Paris Convention; it
also places greater demands on its parties. It requires that they imple-
ment national enforcement procedures, as does the Paris Convention.'
But it also makes explicit demands on the parties, guaranteeing a mini-
mum level of enforcement. 13 This minimum level is significantly higher
than the level of enforcement which many countries provide under the
Paris Convention's national treatment standard.
114
Specifically, Section 2 of TRIPS articulates civil and administrative
procedures and remedies." 5 Under Article 44(1), judicial authorities
shall have the authority to enjoin infringement by preventing the entry
of imported infringing goods. 16 This requirement is tempered by the
caveat that member countries "are not obliged to accord such authority
in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person
prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in
such subject matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual
107. Id. arts. 4.7, 7.1.
108. Id. arts. 8.1, 8.5.
109. Id. art. 15.3.
110. Id. art. 22.
111. Bahree, supra note 97. Experience under GATT, where state espousal has not
generally been perceived as an "unfriendly act," bodes well for dispute resolution under
TRIPS. See JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 93-94 (1989).
112. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 1.
113. Id.; Cordray, supra note 59, at 135.
114. Freeman, supra note 57, at 90.
115. TRIPS, supra note 56, part III, § II.
116. Id. art. 44(1).
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property right."'" 7 This caveat does not make unawareness of infringe-
ment a defense to infringement, for Article 45 allows the rights holder
to recover compensatory damages from knowing infringers, and lost-
profits damages or statutory damages from unknowing infringers."
8
Such an allowance for damages preestablished by national laws relieves
the rights holder of the burden of proving loss of profits or other inju-
ry."19 It recognizes that infringement is damaging, even though the
magnitude of damage is difficult to calculate.
Willful trademark infringers are dealt with harshly by TRIPS. Arti-
cle 61 requires members to "provide for criminal procedures and penal-
ties to be applied at least in cases of willful counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on a commercial scale."' 2° Remedies available shall include
imprisonment and fines sufficient to deter.1
2'
To prevent disputes between signatories, Article 63 requires them to
notify the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (the Council) of their laws and regulations, and to make available
publicly judicial and administrative rulings, as well as laws and regula-
tions.' The role of the Council is to review the operation of the TRIPS
agreement. It has the authority to consider developments which might
warrant the agreement's amendment.
23
B. A Modest Proposal for Extending the Logic of
WTO-TRIPS to Unregistered Marks
As the treaty organization with the largest number of parties, an
effective dispute settlement procedure, and powerful linkages between
intellectual property protection and trade concessions, the WTO should
take the lead in extending trademark protection by adopting an aware-
ness of prior use standard for trademark registration and validity. Its
Council should observe that the logic of TRIPS has not been fully
extended to protect new trademarks that are unknown outside their
nation of origin and are not yet registered anywhere. The Council should
recommend that TRIPS be amended to require that parties implement
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. art. 45.
119. Chicago attorneys Alan Solow and Oscar Alcantara have recently proposed that the
United States Congress amend the Lanham Act in this way. (Proposal on file with Michigan
Journal of International Law).
120. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 61 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 63.
123. Id. art. 71(1).
Michigan Journal of International Law
legislation to recognize a property right in foreign, unregistered, non-
famous trademarks.
1. The Likelihood of Confusion Should Be
Considered Dynamically
Because the value of a trademark lies in its association over time
with a level of quality, the "likelihood of confusion" test should be
dynamic rather than static. The word "likelihood" itself connotes future
probability. Courts should ask not whether confusion is probable today,
but rather whether confusion will be probable in the future.
One of the primary goals of the WTO, NAFTA, and the EC is to
encourage economic growth by lowering trade barriers and supporting
market integration. 24 Consequently, consumers should enjoy an increas-
ing degree of access to imports. By explicitly recognizing knowledge ac-
quired through promotions as relevant to whether a mark is locally well-
known, TRIPS and NAFTA have acknowledged that a nation of con-
sumers may form an impression of a mark before the products it labels
are imported into their country.'25 Whether that mark is registered some-
where is immaterial to their impressions.
Requiring that the original mark already have a reputation in the na-
tional market is not a future-oriented test. Recognition of the effect on
consumers of advertising and other means of conveying reputation short
of actual sales should be taken to its logical conclusion: that the reputa-
tion of a mark in a given market can be affected by another's exploita-
tion of it before it has the opportunity to develop its own presence in
that market. 126 If you slander Individual A to Group B before Group B
has had a chance to meet Individual A, you have still harmed his reputa-
tion. In a shrinking world, it is likely that Group B will eventually meet
Individual A.
2. Toward an "Awareness of Foreign Use" Standard
The "well-known mark" rule should be abandoned in favor of an
"awareness of foreign use" standard. This is not a new idea. Such a
124. Id. pmbl.; NAFrA, supra note 64, art. 102(l)(a); TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 3 (EEC TREATY] art. 3 (as amended by the TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION).
125. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 16(2); NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(6).
126. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted an analogous argument in a trade dress case: "the
legal recognition of an inherently distinctive trademark or trade dress acknowledges the
owner's legitimate proprietary interest in its unique and valuable informational device,
regardless of whether substantial consumer association yet bestows the additional empirical
protection of secondary meaning." Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770-71.
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standard would be consistent with the Trademark Trial and Appeals
Board's decision in Women's World Shops.'2 7 In the wake of the Per-
son's Co. v. Christman Federal Circuit decision, Mr. Carney argued that
an imitator's "knowledge alone" of a trademark's prior use abroad
should negate his rights to preemptively register locally. 128 At the same
time, Professor Donald Chisum, speaking at the 1990 Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, suggested
that it would make sense for the United States to expand U.S. trademark
rights to foreign first users, in light of expanding world trade.
29
This standard would merely protect the "true proprietor," as did the
South African registrar in the opposition proceedings between the Wimpy
chain of hamburger restaurants and Burger King.' 3° Wimpy had regis-
tered the BURGER KING trademark and was opposed by Burger
King.'13 The registrar found that Burger King failed to demonstrate that
it had a reputation in South Africa. 132 It also found, though, that Wimpy
had been aware of Burger King's use of the name abroad, and was there-
fore not the "true proprietor of the mark."' 33 The registrar reasoned that
because Wimpy was not the "true proprietor," it had "no right to apply
for registration.
Both the NAFTA and EC law require use to maintain trademark
registration.135 The EC additionally allows member states to deny or
invalidate the registration of a trademark application made in bad faith.
36
The effect of these provisions is to discourage trademark applications
from those who merely seek to seal off the national market from some-
one else already using the mark abroad. 37 The same purpose is achieved
by U.S. law requiring use or intent to use by applicants. Yet it should not
matter whether the originator can prove that the applicant intended to
shut her out of the market if that is the effect of the applicant's registra-
127. Woman's World Shops v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (TrAB
1988). See supra text accompanying note 46.
128. Carney, supra note 3.
129. Federal Circuit Holds Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 24.
130. Bigger, supra note 4, at 172.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 173.
133. Id. at 174.
134. Id. at 175.
135. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1708(8); Council Directive 89/104/EEC, supra note 79,
art. 12.
136. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, supra note 79, art. 3(2)(d).
137. See Oreste Montalto, Patent and Trademark Developments in the European Commu-
nity, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 299, 309-10 (1993).
Michigan Journal of International Law
tion. TRIPS has already acknowledged that unintentional infringement is
harmful and provides for damages under Article 45. 138
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied Person's Co.'s
request to cancel Mr. Christman's registration. It believed that Mr.
Christman did not intend to shut Person's Co. out of the U.S. market,
because he was not specifically aware of Person's Co.'s intent to import.
He was, however, aware of the fact that Mr. Iwasaki was the first user,
but the Federal Circuit ruled that such awareness alone did not constitute
bad faith.'39 Once we accept that imports are increasingly likely, and rec-
ognize an obligation to the true proprietor, we must conclude that such
awareness does constitute bad faith.
To simply invalidate all registrations where there has been prior use
abroad without the requirement of awareness of such use would paralyze
the system of new registrations, because search costs would be prohibi-
tively high. On the other hand, to invalidate registrations of applicants
who willfully copy a mark used abroad imposes no search costs on good
faith users. Because willful users of existing marks lower their own costs
only at the expense of the prior user, it is reasonable to disallow their
registration.
Of course the same individuals who currently register marks already
in use abroad may seek to take advantage of the rule suggested here by
registering words in anticipation of their future use on some product. It
is unlikely that such a scheme would be profitable, for the odds of suc-
cessfully predicting some future use would be much lower than the odds
faced by those who register existing marks, and the value of uncreated
marks is significantly less than that of marks already in circulation. In
any case, such a scheme would be rendered ineffective by the proposed
rule's requirement that the complaining party must have actually used the
mark in commerce.
CONCLUSION
Given that intellectual property cannot be located at a particular spot
on the globe,' 40 laws governing intellectual property must break out of
the traditional territorial model. As observed by Professor Reichman, "to
pretend that aliens have no legal claims arising from wholesale, unau-
thorized uses of their most valuable property while respecting laws that
138. TRIPS, supra note 56, art. 45.
139. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
140. Paul E. Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS
Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99, 106-07 (1995).
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protect less valuable alien property only because it is tangible rather than
intangible is to exalt form over substance."' 41 To ignore misappropriation
of a trademark because it has neither been timely registered nor become
locally well-known is to exalt form over substance in a nationalistic man-
ner. In pursuit of its objective of encouraging free trade, the TRIPS
Council should recognize that the current system allows interlopers to
foreclose national markets from true proprietors. The Council should
follow the logic of TRIPS to its natural conclusion and declare that regis-
tration with awareness of foreign use constitutes registration in bad faith.
141. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 254 (1993).
